Sgt. Archibald Mathies, USAAF, 510th BS, 351st BG (Medal Of Honour)

February 25, 2025April 28, 2024 / Aviationtrails / 6 Comments

Staff Sgt. Archibald Mathies (U.S. Air Force file photo)*¹

Born in the Scottish town of Stonehouse, South Lanarkshire, on the 3rd June 1918, Archibald (Archie) Mathies was to become a Second World War hero. He was awarded the Medal of Honour (MOH) for his actions whilst at RAF Polebrook (USAAF Station 110) in Northamptonshire, England.

It would be on the 20th February 1944, shortly after arriving at Polebrook, that he would earn this honour but his life would be dramatically cut short.

Not long after his birth in Scotland, Mathies moved with his family to the United States, to a small town in Western Pennsylvania called Finleyville, in Washington County.

After leaving school, he began work in a local coal mine. The work was hard, and the pay was low; Mathies was not inspired. Then, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, as many other brave young American men did, he joined the Army, enlisting in Pittsburgh on the 30th December 1940. Mathies would transition through a number of stations and training centres before finally completing a course in aerial gunnery on the 22nd March 1943. His last U.S. posting was to the 796th Bombardment Squadron at Alexandria, Louisiana for operational training duties flying B-17s. He would leave here on the 8th December 1943 bound for England and the European Theatre of Operations.

Mathies arrived in the U.K. eight days later. His initial assignment was with the Eighth Air Force Replacement Depot, before being attached to the 1st Replacement and Training Squadron. On the 19th January 1944, he received his first and only operational squadron posting; the 510th Bomb Squadron, 351st Bomb Group, based at RAF Polebrook, as an engineer/gunner. Promotion was swift, and on 17th February 1944, probably following his first mission, Mathies was awarded the rank of Staff Sergeant.

A few days later, on 20th February 1944, the allies began the enormous aerial campaign known as ‘Big Week’. During this short period a massive number of aircraft would attack targets deep in the heart of Nazi Germany. One of the first, (Mission 226) would see a total of 417 aircraft fly from airfields across England. From RAF Polebrook, 39 B-17s took off to attack Leipzig. In the lead planes were Maj. Leonard B. Roper (s/n O-734101 ) of the 510th BS forming the high group, and Maj. James T. Stewart (s/n O-659405) of the 508th BS, leading the low group.

Flying in the number three ship of the lower Squadron, in B-17 (42-31763) ‘Ten Horsepower‘ was: Pilot: Clarry Nelson, Co-Pilot: Roland Bartley, Navigator: Walter Truemper, Engineer / Top Turret Gunner: Archie Mathies, Bombardier: Joe Martin, Radio Operator: Joe Rex, Ball Turret Gunner: Carl Moore, Waist Gunner: Tom Sowell, Waist Gunner: Russ Robinson, and Tail Gunner: Magnus Hagbo.

B-17 “Ten Horsepower” – cropped from the photo below- (TU-A, serial number 42-31763) taken prior to its crash”².

On approaching the target, the formation was hit hard by fighters and flak, who would attack the formation for over an hour, hitting many aircraft in the subsequent melee. Ten Horsepower, was targeted repeatedly receiving many hits from 20mm cannon shells. In these attacks the co-pilot was killed and the pilot knocked unconscious from his wounds. Fearing the bomber was doomed, the bombardier jettisoned the bombs and then bailed out, later being captured by the Germans and becoming a prisoner of war. The remaining crew remained with the B-17 which soon began a deathly spiral toward the ground.

Mathies and the navigator (Walter Truemper) would eventually take over control of the aircraft and nurse it back to England. Once over their base at RAF Polebrook, the crew were instructed to bail out but both Mathies and Truemper refused to leave the injured pilot. After deliberation, they were given permission to try to land, the remaining two crew members prepared themselves for a heavy landing.

Guided in by a fellow aviator it was going to be very difficult. The first two attempts had to be aborted, but on the third attempt, as they approached the airfield, the aircraft struck the ground, killing all three crew members onboard.

The last moments of B-17G “Ten Horsepower” (TU-A, #42-21763) piloted by Second Lieutenant Walter E Truemper and Sergeant Archibald Mathies, as it is guided by a fellow aircraft after the pilot was severely injured. Truemper and Mathies unsuccessfully attempted to land the aircraft at Polebrook and were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honour for their bravery, 20th February 1944. (IWM FRE 4724)

The crash was a severe blow for the base, both air and ground crews were devastated. On returning from the mission, five other aircraft (42-38028, 42-38005, 42-39760, 42-39853 and 42-6151). were forced to land at nearby Glatton (Conington) only a short distance away.

This was only Mathies’ second mission and sadly, his last.

For his bravery, Mathies was awarded the Medal of Honour; his name now appears on page 280 of the St. Paul’s Cathedral Roll of Honour. Also, as a dedication to him, one of the temporary lodging units at the Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling is named after him, as is the Airman Leadership School at RAF Feltwell, and the Non commissioned Officer Academy at Keesler AFB, Mississippi. In addition, the bridge on Truemper Drive crossing Military Highway at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; the USCIS Dallas District Office and the Mathies Coal Company in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, are all named in his honour.

Archibald Mathies citation reads:

“For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at risk of life above and beyond the call of duty in action against the enemy in connection with a bombing mission over enemy-occupied Europe on 20 February 1944. The aircraft on which Sgt. Mathies was serving as engineer and ball turret gunner was attacked by a squadron of enemy fighters with the result that the copilot was killed outright, the pilot wounded and rendered unconscious, the radio operator wounded and the plane severely damaged. Nevertheless, Sgt. Mathies and other members of the crew managed to right the plane and fly it back to their home station, where they contacted the control tower and reported the situation. Sgt. Mathies and the navigator volunteered to attempt to land the plane. Other members of the crew were ordered to jump, leaving Sgt. Mathies and the navigator aboard. After observing the distressed aircraft from another plane, Sgt. Mathies’ commanding officer decided the damaged plane could not be landed by the inexperienced crew and ordered them to abandon it and parachute to safety. Demonstrating unsurpassed courage and heroism, Sgt. Mathies and the navigator replied that the pilot was still alive but could not be moved and they would not desert him. They were then told to attempt a landing. After two unsuccessful efforts, the plane crashed into an open field in a third attempt to land. Sgt. Mathies, the navigator, and the wounded pilot were killed“.*³

Mathies was truly a brave and dedicated man, who in the face of adversity, refused to leave his wounded pilot and friend. Daring to land a badly damaged aircraft, he sadly lost his life showing both great courage and determination.

The crew of ‘Ten Horsepower‘ were:

Pilot: Clarry Nelson,
Co-Pilot: Roland Bartley,
Navigator: Walter Truemper
Engineer / Top Turret Gunner: Archie Mathies
Bombardier: Joe Martin (POW)
Radio Operator: Joe Rex,
Ball Turret Gunner: Carl Moore,
Waist Gunner: Tom Sowell,
Waist Gunner: Russ Robinson,
Tail Gunner: Magnus Hagbo

Notes:

*¹ Photo from Malmstrom Air Force Base website.

*² Photo IWM Freeman Collection FRE 4725

*³ Citation taken from: US Army Centre for Military History website.

The Amiens Prison Raid – February 18th 1945

February 18, 2025April 9, 2024 / Aviationtrails / 2 Comments

There are multiple stories of heroism and daring stemming from the Second World War, each and everyone pushing man and machine beyond their boundaries. Many daring missions were flown in which crews performed and completed their task with extraordinary bravery and at great cost to both themselves, and to those on the ground.

Stories such as the ‘Dambusters’ have become famous and commemorated year on year, and yet another daring raid is barely mentioned or even considered by those outside of aviation history. The details of the raid remained secret for years after the event and even now, factual evidence is scarce or difficult to find; even the name of the operation can cause heated debate. The merits of the operation continue to be debated and many are still divided as to what the true purpose of the operation really was.

Whatever the reason behind it however, the historical fact is that the operation was a daring, low-level raid that helped many prisoners of war escape captivity and probably death, and one that was carried out in very difficult circumstances by a group of extremely brave young men.

It was of course the raid on the Amiens prison on February 18th 1944, by nineteen Mosquitoes of 140 Wing based at RAF Hunsdon.

As a new wing, it was formed at RAF Sculthorpe, and would consist of three multinational squadrons, a ‘British’, Australian and New Zealand unit, and all would be based at Hunsdon as part of the RAF’s Second Tactical Air Force (2TAF) designed to support ground troops in the forthcoming invasion of Europe.

Operation ‘Fuller’ – “The Channel Dash”.

February 12, 2025May 29, 2024 / Aviationtrails / 6 Comments

The Second World War was full of extraordinary operations many of which succeeded in their aim resulting in great jubilation on home shores, whilst others will always be remembered for their catastrophic fail and loss of life. In these operations, and even though the mission may have failed, those who took part went far beyond the ‘call of duty’, showing incredible bravery and self sacrifice for the better good.

One such operation took place on February 12th 1942.

Up until now, German warships had been causing havoc in the waters around Britain, sinking in excess of 100,000 tons of allied shipping since the opening days of the war; their ‘trophies’ including the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious and the battleship HMS Hood. In January 1942, three of those German warships responsible the Gneisenau, Scharnhorst (Gluckstein and Salmon as the ships were known by bomber command crews) and Prinz Eugen, all heavily armed and battle hardened, were laying in the port of Brest. Even by remaining there, they were causing the Royal Navy an immense headache, as they were diverted from other important tasks, including operations in the Middle East against German supply ships supplying Rommel, and the valuable protection of allied shipping crossing the Atlantic. The small fleet were a major thorn in the Royal Navy’s side and had to be dealt with.

Coastal Command had been closely monitoring the vessels over a period of months, but information had led to little more than that. With the aim of sinking these ships, the RAF became involved undertaking a total of 299 attacks against them whilst docked in the port. During these attacks, forty-three aircraft were lost along with 247 brave airmen. Included in these raids, were in December 1941, ten such operations by Bomber Command which resulted in the loss of some twenty aircraft and seventy airmen. On the 8th of that month, forty-seven bombers escorted by ten fighter squadrons also attacked the docks. Whilst the three ships remained intact, three enemy fighters were claimed to have been shot down but with with the loss of four Stirlings.

During this time though, the ships were indeed hit, and in the case of Scharnhorst, damaged badly, but none ever badly enough not to be beyond repair.

The decision was eventually made therefore, to move the ships, Hitler’s fear of a second front being opened in Scandinavia proving to be the deciding factor. On that decision two routes were considered, the northern route around Scotland which would take the small, but powerful fleet in range of British carriers and warships at Scapa Flow, a fight the Germans did not want to engage in. Alternatively, they could attempt a daring dash through the narrow and well defended English Channel. It was a difficult decision to make.

The presence of the ship and their likely move to safer harbours prompted William Helmore (one of those behind the Turbinlite project) to go to the Alan Muntz Company with an idea as to how to sink them. In conjunction with GEC, RAE Farnborough, Dowty and Stones of Deptford to name but a few, the idea of a radio controlled, 5 ton torpedo with a diameter of 39 inches able to fit a Lancaster bomber, was devised.

The idea was that a Mosquito would control the torpedo once it had been dropped from the Lancaster, and a mast would rise to maintain radio contact with the controlling aircraft. The torpedo would have a range of 25 miles with a warhead weighing 1 ton, limited only by the size of the Lancaster. While tests were carried out, many issues raised their heads including an air supply for the engine, (a Meteor Tank engine) which all proved too complicated and the project was eventually shelved*⁴.

However, following a meeting on January 12th, 1942 between many top ranking German officials including Hitler, Raeder (the C In C of the Navy), Vice-Admiral Ciliax and Adolf Galland as commander of the Luftwaffe in the Channel area, a decision was finally made, the shorter English Channel route would be the one to take and so Operation Cerberus, (the breakout) was born.

The decision raised great concerns though. Both Galland and other Luftwaffe officials knew that there were too few available fighters in the region – just some two groups and a few training units – to be able to provide the 24 hour protection the ships needed as they dashed through the straits. Night fighters were especially needed, a decision which was affirmed and granted by Major General Jeschonnek, the Luftwaffe Chief of Staff; but the numbers of aircraft available to Galland would still remain greatly inferior to those on British soil ready to attack.

So, Operation Thunderbolt (Donnerkeil ) was put in place, the air umbrella that would protect the ships as they sailed northward. Operation Cerebus (the breakout) was affirmed with February 11th chosen as ‘X’ day, and a sailing time set at 8:00pm. In the weeks leading up to the ‘dash’, German transmitting stations based at both Calais and Cherbourg, began a cat and mouse game transmitting a series of elaborate but false messages to interfere with British radar stations along the south coast. They provided a cover story, suggesting that the fleet would set sail but head toward the Pacific in support of the Japanese and not north to Scandinavia. In preparation, trial runs were made to test engines, guns and communications. The British, still monitoring their actions, began a series of raids on the port, none of which achieved any great success.

During these attacks, which had been occurring regularly since early January, several aircraft were lost including: three Manchesters from 61 Squadron; two Hampdens from 144 Sqn; three Wellingtons, one each from 12, 142 and 300 Sqns and on the 10th February, another Manchester from 61 Sqn.

To meet the anticipated challenge, Galland had some 252 fighters, including a mix of 109s, 190s and some thirty 110 night fighters at his disposal, but he argued, it was still not enough to provide the cover he wanted.

As ‘X’ day approached, the radars went wild with false readings and interference. But the British, now aware of an impending escape, were on high alert, additional Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) were docked at Dover and Swordfish aircraft were drafted in to RAF Manston in Kent. Some 1,100 magnetic mines were laid along the projected route and Dover command was put on standby. At 8:00pm on February 11th, the flotilla began to assemble outside of Brest harbour, just as a routine air raid was launched, and so the port was shut down. Although only one aircraft was lost, a Wellington from 150 Sqn, the raid proved no more than a nuisance, only delaying the fleet’s departure by two hours.

Now temporarily blinded by false radio measures, the British were unable to ‘see’ the mighty armada as it finally slipped out into the open waters of the Channel. Their escape had been a success.

During the night, good progress was made by the fleet and the lost time was made up quickly. Meanwhile, the skies remained quiet, the British not yet realising the ruse. The early morning remained dark, night fighters patrolled along side the fleet at wave top level, thus avoiding detection by British radar. Day fighters joined them in a relay operation that would be held below the cloud ceiling of 1,500 feet.

At 11:00 am on the 12th, the Germans intercepted a British message signalling that the fleet had been spotted. But it remained another hour before further RAF aircraft were seen, the British being wary and unsure of the message’s accuracy. Even though for months the British Command had been monitoring the fleet, those in command failed to act on valuable information, a mistake that led to a vital delay in operations.

Then, in the early hours of the afternoon, as the fleet approached the narrowest point of the Channel, British defences at Dover opened fire. A sea battle then raged between German warships and British MTBs, but for all their valiant efforts they failed to achieve their goal.

At 13:20 A group of sixteen Spitfires took off from Kenley on a Beaufort escort mission that were sent out to search for, and attack the fleet. They initially rendezvoused with twelve more Spitfires from 602 Sqn, but then failed to meet the Beauforts over Manston. The formation then continued on to the target area looking for the convoy and its escort. Soon after arriving over the Channel, 485 (NZ) Sqn’s leader, Group Captain, Francis V. Beamish DSO and Bar, DFC, AFC, spotted six destroyers, two E-Boats and two German Battle cruisers. At his altitude there was no fighter escort, the mix of Bf109s and FW190s remaining firmly below radar level at 600ft.

Seizing his chance, Beamish then attacked one of the destroyers raking it with gunfire along the length of its deck, a Spitfire’s guns were no match for the destroyer though and little damage was done. The remaining aircraft of the two squadrons then took on the enemy who were forming a low level protective umbrella, achieving a greater rate of success with several ‘kills’ being reported back at Kenley.

Now fully aware of the situation, the RAF and Navy were called into action. At RAF Manston, eighteen young men began to prepare for take off, their target, the escaping German fleet of some sixty-six surface vessels including the warships Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen, now sailing almost unopposed through the English Channel.

The six Fairy Swordfish of 825 Naval Air Squadron were ageing biplanes, they were no match for Galland’s fast and more dominant fighters, nor the defensive guns of the mighty German fleet they were hoping to attack. To pitch a handful of biplanes with torpedoes against such a heavily armed and well prepared armada, turned out to be no less than suicide.

In front of their Swordfish, Lieut Cdr E Esmonde, RN, (2nd Left) on board HMS Ark Royal, October 1941. This photo was taken after the attack on the Bismark, and includes the various aircrew who received decorations as a result of that daring attack. (Left to right: Lieut P D Gick, RN, awarded DSC; Lieut Cdr E Esmonde, RN, awarded DSO; Sub Lieut V K Norfolk, RN, awarded DSC; A/PO Air L D Sayer. awarded DSM; A/ Ldg Air A L Johnson, awarded DSM). (© IWM A 5828)

The winter of 1942 was very cold, but the Swordfish were kept ready, engines warmed and torpedoes armed, now they could no longer wait, and instead of attacking as planned at night, they would have to attack during the day, and so the order to go was given. The crews started their engines and set off on their daring mission in what was appalling weather.

Shortly after take off, the escort arrived, merely ten Spitfires from No. 72 Squadron RAF, led by Squadron Leader Brian Kingcombe, and not the five Spitfire squadrons promised. The six Swordfish, led by Lt. Cdr. Eugene Esmonde, dived down to 50 feet and began their attack. Hoping to fly below the level of the anti-aircraft guns each of the six Swordfish flew gallantly toward their targets. Eventually, and even though they were hit and badly damaged, they pressed home their attacks, but they were out-gunned, and out performed, and just twenty minutes after the attack began, all six had fallen victim to the German guns. No torpedoes had struck home.

Of the eighteen men who took off that day, only five were to survive.

Leading the attack, Lt. Cdr. Esmonde (an ex-Imperial Airways captain) was warded the V.C. Posthumously, he had previously been awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his part in the attack on the Battleship Bismark; an award that also went to: S/Lt. B Rose, S/Lt. E Lee, S/Lt. C Kingsmill, and S/Lt. R Samples. Flying with them, L/A. D. Bunce was awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal and twelve of the airmen were mentioned in dispatches.

The attack became known as ‘The Channel dash’ officially called Operation Fuller, and in honour of the brave attempt to hit the German fleet that day, a memorial was erected in Ramsgate Harbour, the names of the eighteen Swordfish crew are listed where their story is inscribed for eternity.

Operation Fuller was a disaster not only for the Royal Navy and Coastal Command who had been monitoring the fleet for many months, but also for the Royal Air Force. A force of some 100 aircraft made up from almost every Group of Bomber Command had made its way to the Channel. By the time evening had dawned, it had become clear that some sixteen aircraft from the force had been lost. The loss of life from those sixteen aircraft totalled sixty-four, with a further five being captured and incarcerated as prisoners of war.*¹

Bomber Command were not without their terrible stories either. The sad loss of W/C. R MacFadden DFC and his six crew who remained in their dingy after their Wellington from 214 Sqn ditched in the cold waters of the Channel. Over a period of 72 hours all but Sgt. Murray, slowly died from the cold, he being rescued at the last minute and incarcerated by the Germans. Of all the RAF squadrons that took part that day, their losses amounted to: 49 Sqn (4 x Hampdens); 50 Sqn (1 x Hampden); 103 Sqn (1 x Wellington); 110 Sqn (1 x Blenheim); 114 Sqn (1 x Blenheim); 144 Sqn (2 x Hampdens); 214 Sqn (1 x Wellington); 419 Sqn (2 x Wellingtons); 420 Sqn (2 x Hampdens) and 455 Sqn (1 x Hampden)*²

February 12th had been a disaster, so bad that The Daily Mirror reported on February 16th 1942 under the headline “9 Lost Hours in the Channel“, that a demand had been put forward to Parliament for a complete statement on Naval strategy during the event. It also questioned the “suitability of Admiral Sir Dudley Pound”, in fulfilling his role. The paper goes onto say that a lag of some nine hours had largely been ignored by officials, that being the time between the first notice and when action was finally taken against the fleet. It also says that although the initial sighting was no earlier than 10:42 am, it took another hour before it too was responded to. The public had been mislead it believed.

The entire operation has been badly organised by those in command, with little or no cohesion nor coordination between this various forces involved. As a result, the entire operation was a catastrophe with a major loss of life and no real result. The entire operation was seen by some as akin to a “Gilbert and Sullivan” comedy*³.

However, from that disaster came stories of untold heroism, bravery and self sacrifice by a group of men that have turned this event into one of Britain’s most remarkable and incredible stories of the war.

*¹ To read more about Bomber Commands part in operation Fuller and a German film of the event, see the Pathfinders Website.

*² Chorley, W.R., “Bomber Command Losses of the Second World War – 1942” 1994, Midland Counties publications.

*³ Bennet, D “Pathfinder“, Goodall, 1998

*⁴ McCloskey, K., “Airwork – A History.” The History Press, 2012

A German account of the ‘dash’ is given in “The First and the Last” by Adolf Galland published in 1955 by Meuthuen & Co.. Ltd.

Smith. G., “Heroes of Bomber Command – Cambridgeshire“. Countryside Books (2007)

National Archives AIR 27/1933/20, AIR 27/1933/21

RAF East Kirkby – Part 3 – the End of an Era.

February 1, 2025December 22, 2024 / Aviationtrails / 8 Comments

In Part 2, we saw how crews at East Kirkby took a battering over Germany and how the Allies turned their attention to the forthcoming invasion.

In this, the final part, the war finally comes to an end and RAF East Kirkby eventually closes, but not without making its mark.

With spring at an end, thoughts turned back to the impending invasion and the bombing of pinpoint targets in France: Railways, munitions factories, troop concentrations and transport links became the focus for Harris’s Air Force. Throughout the month of April both East Kirkby squadrons were in operations, and whilst not significantly high, a number of aircraft were lost adding to the lengthening list of casualties and those now missing.

The end of this period of the war was remarkable for several reasons, notably when Wing Commander Leonard Cheshire of 617 Sqn, flew a Mosquito at low level and marked the target, a factory in Toulouse, with great success. This delighted Harris, who gave the all clear to 5 Group to operate independently of the Pathfinders of 8 Group, a decision that did little to heal the growing rift between Don Bennett and Ralph Cochrane who had taken the idea to Harris in the first place.

Other targets then became the focus for 5 Group including the railway yards at La Chapelle. In the operation Cheshire put this method to the test once more. with 617 Sqn again to marking the target in conjunction with 8 Group’s Pathfinders. In the operation, 247 Lancasters from 5 Group were ordered to attack a pin point target. In the attack, 57 Sqn lost two aircraft. Of these two Lancasters the first, LL893 ‘DX-J’ was lost with all seven lives over St-Omer whilst the second, Lancaster MK. III ND582 ‘DX-S’ crashed after attempting a landing at Croydon. After overshooting the runway the aircraft, piloted by Canadian F.O. H. Young, struck at least three homes in Lavender Vale, a street adjoining the airfield. Three of the crew died immediately and a further one died from his injuries in hospital.